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NOTE
NOT A KING: PRESIDENT TRUMP
AND THE CASE FOR
PRESIDENTIAL SUBPOENA
REFORM
ROBERT J. DENAULT*
INTRODUCTION
One of the earliest investigations into a sitting president began in
1796. The House of Representatives demanded documents from
President George Washington as part of its investigation into a treaty
he had negotiated with Great Britain.1 Washington refused to comply,
resting his argument on a doctrine now known as Executive Privilege—
the concept that private communications between a president and his
advisors should remain confidential so that the president may exercise
the full powers of the office uninhibited.2 Since Washington’s refusal, a
number of presidents have been dogged by other kinds of
investigations—for conduct official or private, for matters criminal or
civil. But no president has been subject to investigation like Donald
Trump.
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1. George Washington, Message to the House Regarding Documents Relative to the Jay
Treaty, Mar. 30, 1796, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/gw003.asp. In one of the earliest
invocations of privilege over U.S. government documents, President Washington responded to a
House request for his written negotiation instructions given to Secretary of State John Jay, who
held a series of meetings with British diplomats to draft a treaty on Washington’s behalf. See
generally id. The House was considering repealing the treaty and wanted the negotiation
instructions to determine whether the negotiation was flawed. Washington refused to turn over
the documents, citing the secretive “nature of foreign negotiation” and the lack of any
constitutional purpose for the House to demand them—highlighting that it had not passed a
resolution mentioning impeachment. Id. Washington’s refusal laid the foundation for the
Executive Privilege.
2. Id.
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Federal law enforcement, Congress, and State prosecutors in New
York all conducted investigations of Trump during his presidency. Even
this list is not exhaustive: it excludes two impeachment proceedings—
one for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress and the second for
inciting insurrection—as well as a number of civil lawsuits against
Trump in his personal capacity.3 The scale of investigation was
unprecedented. Yet it is President Trump’s unique strategy to opposing
investigations that renders his treatment of investigations remarkable.
Two predecessors, Presidents Nixon and Clinton, were faced with
similar investigative perils, but responded in far less dramatic fashion.
Nixon moved to quash a subpoena for his Oval Office tapes on the
grounds that they were shielded by Executive Privilege. Clinton
accepted the validity of a number of subpoenas but objected to a civil
lawsuit by claiming he was constitutionally immune to such
proceedings while president. Both Nixon and Clinton pursued their
arguments at the Supreme Court; both lost.
President Trump did not file straightforward motions to quash
grand jury subpoenas, nor did he narrowly accommodate requests from
investigators. Instead, he argued that he was completely exempt from
complying with all demands for information—including demands by
state prosecutors and Congress. In both logic and spirit, these
arguments contradicted the holdings of United States v. Nixon,4 which
held that neither Executive Privilege nor presidential status render
grand jury subpoenas unenforceable, and Clinton v. Jones, which held
that presidents are not absolutely immune from judicial proceedings
while in office.5
Trump escaped the long shadows of Nixon and Jones in part
because of defects in our legal system that demand our attention. First,
Special Counsel regulations—a hastily developed replacement for
independent prosecutor statutes—are gravely defective and foster
unnecessary secrecy and confusion. Second, courts’ deference to
presidents appearing in personal capacities allowed Trump to pursue
brazen and unfounded constitutional claims. Finally, a lack of legal
3. See, e.g., Trump v. Carroll, 52 N.Y.S.3d 330, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (addressing a civil
lawsuit for against Trump for sexual assault); D.C. v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 733 (D.C. Md.
2018) (addressing emoluments clause lawsuits against Trump for his private businesses); Jacobus
v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (addressing a civil lawsuit against Trump and
noting that “Trump was at all relevant times a candidate” and not sitting president for the
purposes of the litigation).
4. 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
5. 520 U.S. 681, 705–06 (1997).
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clarity about Congressional subpoenas allowed Trump to stonewall a
co-equal branch of government. The result was something neither
Clinton nor Nixon accomplished: concealment of relevant evidence
until Trump’s term had ended.
Part I examines various investigations into President Trump. Part II
reviews the respective legal approaches Presidents Nixon, Clinton, and
Trump enlisted to counter presidential subpoenas in courts of law. Part
III explores more deeply the problems that allowed Trump’s delay
tactics and temporary evasion of lawful subpoenas. It goes on to
recommend policy solutions that would prevent future presidents from
invoking similarly unpersuasive arguments. Unless reforms are
implemented, it will be left to the same judicial process to remind the
next iteration of President Trump that he or she is not king—a truth so
fundamental to our constitutional system it should go without saying
more than two centuries into the American experiment.6
I. A PRESIDENT UNDER SIEGE
During Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, a series of contacts
between Trump Campaign officials and individuals connected to
Russian government intelligence agencies sparked an FBI
investigation.7 After Trump’s win, U.S. intelligence agencies recorded
Michael Flynn, then President-Elect Trump’s named National Security
Advisor, speaking with the Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak.8 In
that conversation, Flynn implicitly promised to lift sanctions on Russia
that were imposed by President Obama in response to Russia’s
interference in the 2016 election.9 The conversation raised the specter
of prosecution under the Logan Act, a criminal statute prohibiting
private citizens from conducting foreign policy.10

6. Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 213 (D.D.C. 2019) (pointing
out that the “primary takeaway from the past 250 years of recorded American history is that
Presidents are not kings”).
7. 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION 80–81 (2019) [hereinafter Mueller Report
Vol. I].
8. Evan Perez & Jim Sciutto, US Investigating Flynn Calls with Russian Diplomat, CNN
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/flynn-russia-callsinvestigation/index.html.
9. Letter from Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Sens. Grassley and Johnson (May 29, 2020),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/odni-grassley-johnson-flynn-transcripts.
10. Clare Foran, What Is the Logan Act and What Does It Have to Do With Flynn?, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/logan-actmichael-flynn-trump-russia/516774/.
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The FBI was also aware of a series of private reports collected by
Trump’s opponents regarding his relationship with Russia.11 The
reports cited Russian sources and sub-sources and included a number
of unverified allegations: namely, that Trump knew of Russia’s election
interference operation, that Russia financially supported Trump, that
Russian banks financed election interference, and that Russia
possessed videos depicting Trump in compromising positions.12 Those
reports and news of Flynn’s calls to the Ambassador were leaked to the
public as Trump assumed office.13 Eventually, the controversy forced
Flynn to resign.14 Trump repeatedly demanded that FBI Director James
Comey drop any further investigation and asked that he publicly
declare that Trump was not under investigation with regard to Russia.15
The Director refused,16 and eventually, Trump fired him.17 What ensued
was a series of investigations: several by federal law enforcement,
others by Congress, and a criminal investigation by New York State
prosecutors.
A. The “Feds”
Federal investigations, though not legally challenged by President
Trump, informed probes by Congress and the Manhattan D.A.’s office,
both of which Trump ultimately challenged.18 These investigations
began with the firing of FBI Director Comey: Trump ordered Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein to draft a letter announcing
Comey’s dismissal and to include in that letter a comment that the

11. Statement for the R. from James Comey, to Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jun.
8, 2017).
12. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, & Mark Schoofs, These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep
NEWS
(Jan.
10,
2017),
Ties
to
Russia,
BUZZFEED
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/these-reports-allege-trump-has-deep-tiesto-russia.
13. David Ignatius, Why Did Obama Dawdle on Russia’s Hacking?, WASH. POST (Jan. 12,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-did-obama-dawdle-on-russiashacking/2017/01/12/75f878a0-d90c-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html.
14. Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Flynn Resigns as National Security Advisor, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/donald-trump-nationalsecurity-adviser-michael-flynn.html.
15. Open Hr’g with Former FBI Director James Comey: Hr’g before the Select Comm. on
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, 114th Cong. 4 (2017) (statement of Sen. Mark Warner).
16. Id.
17. Maggie Haberman et al., ‘Enough Was Enough’: How Festering Anger at Comey Ended
in His Firing, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/howtrump-decided-to-fire-james-comey.html.
18. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412
(2020).
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Russia investigation was a hoax—which troubled Rosenstein.19 A draft
without the Russia language was made public and Comey was removed
from his position.20
The next morning, Trump met with the Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov and said, “I just fired the head of the FBI. He was crazy,
a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off
. . . I’m not under investigation.”21 When news outlets reported these
comments, the White House responded that Trump really meant to say
that Comey had “created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage
and negotiate with Russia.”22 Shortly after, Trump gave a nationally
televised interview during which he stated that when he decided to fire
Comey, he was thinking, “[Y]ou know, this Russia thing with Trump and
Russia is a made-up story. It’s an excuse by the Democrats for having
lost an election they should’ve won.”23 In response to these events,
Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein—on his own volition—
appointed former FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III as a Department
of Justice Special Counsel to investigate Russian election
interference.24
Over the course of a two-year investigation, Mueller prosecuted
thirty-four people, three Russian organizations, and obtained a number
of guilty pleas and convictions.25 Early in the investigation, reporters
from The New York Times asked Trump whether Mueller would cross
a “red line” if he looked at Trump’s finances and his family members’
finances for connections to Russia.26 Trump responded, “I would say
yes . . . . [I]t’s possible there’s a condo or something . . . and somebody
from Russia buys a condo, who knows? I don’t make any money from
Russia.”27 Trump continued, “No, I think that’s a violation. Look, this is

19. See 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION 62 (2019) [hereinafter Mueller Report
Volume II].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 73.
24. Dep’t of Justice, App’t of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the
2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, Order No. 3915-2017 (May. 17, 2017)
[hereinafter Appointment Order].
25. Ashley Turner, What We Know About Special Counsel Mueller’s Russia Probe So Far,
CNBC (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/22/what-we-know-about-specialcounsel-muellers-russia-probe-so-far.html.
26. Excerpts from the Times’s Interview with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/trump-interview-transcript.html.
27. Id.
INTO
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about Russia. So, I think if he wants to go, my finances are extremely
good, my company is an unbelievably successful company . . . . But I
have no income from Russia. I don’t do business with Russia.”28
Mueller did not examine Trump’s personal finances, nor did he
investigate financial crimes like bribery, tax fraud, or money laundering
related to Trump.29 The scope of Mueller’s investigation was narrowly
focused on election interference activity.30 But Mueller referred a
number of cases to other investigators: For instance, after he had
interviewed Michael Cohen, the President’s then-personal attorney
and an executive at the Trump Organization, Mueller referred to the
appropriate authorities in New York information about possible
campaign finance law violations involving payments made during
Trump’s presidential campaign to women with whom he had had
extramarital affairs.31 But Mueller never spoke publicly once during the
investigation, and his silence left the scope of his work largely unclear
to outsiders. Some members of Congress expressed dismay that it
seemed like Mueller had left many stones unturned—namely, financial
ties between Trump and Russia.32
Twelve other cases that Mueller referred elsewhere remain
redacted.33 Cohen surrendered to the FBI on August 21, 2018, and pled
guilty to eight criminal charges: five counts of tax evasion, one count of
making false statements to a financial institution, one count of willfully
causing an unlawful corporate contribution, and one count of making
an excessive campaign contribution at Trump’s request.34 The press

28. Id.
29. Testimony of Robert Mueller to the House Intelligence Committee, July 24, 2019,
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/IG00/20190724/109808/HHRG-116-IG00-Transcript20190724.pdf.
30. See Appointment Order, supra note 24.
31. Dareh Gregorian, Mueller Mystery: What are the other 12 criminal referrals?, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 18, 2019 5:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/mueller-mystery-whatare-12-criminal-referrals-n996166.
32. Jen Kirby, The Last Minutes of Mueller’s Testimony Made the Best Case for the Russia
Investigation, VOX (Jul. 24, 2019, 4:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/7/24/20726405/mueller-testimony-russian-interference-adam-schiff.
33. One case reportedly involved an investigation Mueller pursued regarding an Egyptian
bank in relation to an alleged $10 million contribution to Trump’s 2016 campaign, but the case
was closed after Attorney General Barr replaced the attorney overseeing the office handling the
matter. Katelyn Polantz, Evan Perez, & Jeremy Herb, Feds Chased Suspected Foreign Link to
Trump’s 2016 Campaign Cash for Three Years, CNN (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:59 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/politics/trump-campaign-donation-investigation/index.html.
34. Press Release, Michael Cohen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Eight
Counts, Including Criminal Tax Evasion and Campaign Finance Violations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Aug. 21, 2018) (on file with author).
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reported that federal prosecutors in New York were focused on the
Trump Organization,35 but as of March, 2021, no such investigation has
emerged.
B. Congress
Before Cohen began serving his sentence, he testified publicly for
more than seven hours before the House Oversight Committee about
his work with Trump and the Trump Organization.36 He detailed
Trump’s potential misconduct before and during his presidency:
unlawfully reimbursing hush money payments during his presidential
campaign, implicitly directing Cohen to lie to investigators, and filing
false financial statements with banks and insurance companies before
he assumed office.37 Cohen’s testimony prompted the House of
Representatives to investigate President Trump and the Trump
Organization. In April 2019, the House Intelligence Committee and the
House Financial Services Committee issued subpoenas to the
President’s accounting firm, Mazars USA, and his primary lender,
Deutsche Bank AG, for ten years of Trump’s financial records.38
House Committee members justified their investigations by
emphasizing that Mueller had not pursued Trump’s foreign financial
ties.39 President Trump immediately filed petitions to block
Congressional subpoenas from enforcement in federal court.40 He

35. Luppe Luppen & Hunter Walker, New York Attorney General Unveils Investigation into
Trump Company’s Finances, YAHOO NEWS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/new-yorkattorney-general-unveils-investigation-into-trump-companys-finances-223323626.html.
Two
sources familiar with the situation told Yahoo News that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York was conducting an aggressive investigation into Trump’s real
estate business in 2019, with a specific focus on questionable practices related to the valuation of
his properties. The New York Attorney General also alluded to the existence of a federal
investigation in court documents.
36. Testimony of Michael D. Cohen, Comm. on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Rep.
116–03 (Feb. 27, 2019).
37. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2022 (2020).
38. Jan Wolfe, Trump Sues to Block Congress Subpoena for His Financial Records,
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2019, 9:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumpcongress/trump-sues-to-block-congress-subpoena-for-his-financial-records-idUSKCN1RY0YD.
39. See Kyle Cheney & Zachary Warmbrodt, Schiff Says FBI Hasn’t Probed National
Security Risks of Trump’s Foreign Financial Ties, POLITICO (Aug. 26, 2020, 5:19 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/26/adam-schiff-fbi-trump-foreign-financial-ties-402318
(noting that despite Mueller’s refusal, the Intelligence Committee would continue to press for
bank records).
40. David Farenthold et al., Trump Sues in Bid to Block Congressional Subpoena of
Financial Records, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpsues-in-bid-to-block-congressional-subpoena-of-financial-records/2019/04/22/a98de3d0-650011e9-82ba-fcfeff232e8f_story.html.

DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/14/2021 4:26 PM

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY, SPECIAL COUNSEL REFORMS, & TRUMP

153

claimed that Congress had no legitimate legislative reason to subpoena
his financial records, was acting as law enforcement, and was using its
subpoena power to harass the President.41
C. The State of New York
Not long after Congress had issued its subpoenas to Mazars and
Deutsche Bank, New York State investigators did the same. They issued
a nearly identical subpoena to Trump’s accounting firm. President
Trump moved to block that subpoena, too, arguing that “the person
who serves as President, while in office, enjoys absolute immunity from
criminal process of any kind.”42
The background of the New York State investigation highlights
some deficiencies in the Special Counsel’s probe. Early on in Mueller’s
tenure as Special Counsel, his team traveled to New York to meet with
state investigators in order to establish cooperation between offices.43
Public reporting suggested that Mueller’s team was working with New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman on possible money
laundering violations, but Mueller never brought such charges.44 After
Cohen was indicted on federal charges for the illegal hush money
payments made during the 2016 campaign,45 many speculated that New
York federal prosecutors were picking up cases handed off by
Mueller.46 Although Cohen’s federal indictment stated that he had
committed crimes “at the direction of” Donald Trump, no further
federal investigation of Trump materialized in New York.47 But then, a
year after Mueller had completed his report, the Manhattan District
Attorney subpoenaed the Trump Organization for its corporate

41. See Wolfe, supra note 38.
42. Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
43. Josh Dawsey, Mueller Teams Up with New York Attorney General in Manafort Probe,
POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/30/manafort-muellerprobe-attorney-general-242191.
44. Id.
45. Ben Protess & William K. Raushbaum, Manhattan D.A. Subpoenas Trump
Organization Over Stormy Daniels Hush Money Payments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/nyregion/trump-cohen-stormy-daniels-vance.html.
46. Christina Wilkie, Mueller Referred Evidence of 14 Other Potential Crimes to Federal
Officials. Only Two of Them are Publicly Known, CNBC (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/18/mueller-evidence-14-potential-crimes-only-two-publiclyknown.html.
47. Darren Samuelsohn, Feds’ Probe into Trump Hush Money Payments is Over, Judge
Says, POLITICO (Jul. 17, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/17/trump-hush-moneypayments-probe-over-1418074.
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records,48 launching a state criminal investigation of the President.
The D.A. was examining whether senior executives at the Trump
Organization had falsified business records about the hush money
payments, which may have violated state criminal law.49 When it
emerged that the D.A. had also sent a grand jury subpoena to Trump’s
accounting firm, Mazars, for tax records dating back to 2011, it became
clear that the investigation was broader than originally reported.50
Later filings indicated that the investigation involved fraud and that the
grand jury was investigating a “protracted period of criminal conduct”
at President Trump’s business.51 The New York Times reported that
Trump’s primary lender, Deutsche Bank, had already complied with
subpoenas a year earlier.52 Faced with two probes into his finances,
Trump attempted to block the New York investigation too, employing
expansive constitutional claims that bore closer resemblance to the
rights of a king than a president.53
II. A NOVEL DISREGARD FOR THE LAW
Although it is true that almost every modern president has been
investigated,54 there are only two presidents who were investigated in a
manner remotely close to the investigations described above: Richard
Nixon and Bill Clinton. Both took different approaches to resisting
investigators—and both lost. Examining their failed arguments
demonstrates that President Trump’s attempts to block investigators
were remarkably unmoored from both political and legal precedent.

48. Protess & Raushbaum, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Tom Winter & Hallie Jackson, Manhattan DA Subpoenas Trump’s Tax Returns in Probe
NEWS
(Sept.
16,
2019),
of
Hush
Money
Payments,
NBC
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/manhattan-da-subpoenas-trump-s-tax-returnsprobe-hush-money-n1055046.
51. William K. Rashbaum & Benjamin Weiser, D.A. Is Investigating Trump and His
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2020),
Company
Over
Fraud,
Filing
Suggests,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/nyregion/donald-trump-taxes-cyrus-vance.html.
52. David Enrich et al., Trump’s Bank Was Subpoenaed by N.Y. Prosecutors in Criminal
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/nyregion/trump-taxesvance-deutsche-bank.html.
53. In Mazars, the Court held that President Trump’ constitutional claims would “seriously
risk impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities,” did not distinguish between privileged
and nonprivileged information, or official and personal information, and represented a
“significant departure from the longstanding way of doing business between the branches [of
government].” Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2023 (2020).
54. Sonam Sheth, Obama is the only president since Nixon who didn’t face an independent
investigation, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-nixontrump-russia-independent-investigation-2017-10.
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Trump went further than either comparable predecessor: He rebuffed
demands for information about his finances, claimed a “total
immunity” that appeared internally illogical and inconsistent with
precedent, and avoided filing proper claims in order to delay
transmission of evidence until after the 2020 election. While he did not
prevail in court, Trump succeeded in concealing evidence about his
finances during his presidency, something that Nixon and Clinton both
failed to do.
A. President Nixon’s Approach
President Nixon faced a perilous criminal investigation, which also
ensnared his closest associates, but his efforts to counter investigators
were the most straightforward of the three presidents examined in this
Note. First, Nixon asserted Executive Privilege, a legal principle
recognized in American law. Second, the Supreme Court expedited the
process of hearing the appeal on Nixon’s motion to quash the subpoena
due to its regard of the public importance of the matter. Third, Nixon’s
limited cooperation with prosecutors allowed them to file a narrow
subpoena. Fourth, Nixon filed a straightforward motion to quash
instead of invoking some form of absolute immunity associated with
the presidential office. Finally, Nixon’s claim of privilege covered
official conduct, not personal conduct. In later sections, comparisons
between these aspects of Nixon’s case and President Trump’s approach
to investigations demonstrates the radical nature of Trump’s
arguments.
Like President Trump, a cohort of President Nixon’s campaign staff
was involved in potentially criminal conduct aimed at hobbling the
chances of Nixon’s political opponents.55 They broke into the
Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate Complex in
Washington, D.C., where they had planned to photograph campaign
documents and install wiretaps in telephones.56 The DNC Chairman’s
phone was among the phones to be tapped.57 But the wiretaps were not
55. See generally JOHN DEAN, THE NIXON DEFENSE: WHAT HE KNEW AND WHEN HE
KNEW IT 12–13 (2014) (describing a conspiracy to break into the DNC offices at the Watergate
Hotel to plant eavesdropping devices).
56. Walter Rugaber, Watergate Trial in Closed Session, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/18/archives/watergate-trial-in-closed-session-judge-clearscourt-to-hear.html.
57. Robert Pear, Watergate, Then and Now—2 Decades After a Political Burglary, the
TIMES
(Jun.
15,
1992),
Questions
Still
Linger,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/us/watergate-then-now-2-decades-after-political-burglaryquestions-still-linger.html.
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entirely effective, so the conspirators had to return to the scene of the
crime to repair the problems.58 A security guard noticed the intruders
when they returned the second time, and he alerted police. Five men
were arrested at the scene and charged with attempted burglary and
attempted interception of telephone and other communications.59 By
January 1973, the burglars had been convicted or had pleaded guilty—
just days after Nixon’s second inauguration.60
White House officials moved to distance President Nixon from the
criminal endeavor. John Dean, a White House lawyer, later testified
that a top Nixon aide, John Ehrlichman, had ordered him to destroy
evidence.61 Nixon blocked FBI investigations into the source of funding
for the burglaries.62 Dean believed he could go to prosecutors and tell
them the truth in order to protect Nixon, but when he discussed this
plan with Nixon, he suspected that the President was recording their
conversations.63 Later, during Senate hearings, Dean revealed this
suspicion, which triggered Congressional and grand jury subpoenas for
what became known as “the Nixon tapes.”64
Department of Justice Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and the
Senate subpoenaed the tapes, but Nixon asserted Executive Privilege
over them.65 Once former senior White House aides had been indicted,
Nixon released transcripts of the relevant White House tapes in an
acknowledgement that they were not entirely shielded by privilege.
Still, believing the audio would be far more damaging, he continued
fighting to keep the recordings hidden.
The Supreme Court took up the Executive Privilege issue in United

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Trials began January 8, 1973; E. Howard Hunt pled guilty January 11; four others pled
guilty January 15; two others were convicted after trial on January 30. THE WATERGATE FILES:
TIMELINE,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/content.php?section=1&p
age=a (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
61. DEAN, supra note 55, at 425.
62. Alfred E. Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH. POST (Jun. 18,
1972),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html.
63. DEAN, supra note 55, at 240–41.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974). It should be noted that President Nixon
fired Cox and several other Department of Justice officials in an effort to curtail the investigation,
but the subpoena for the tapes was continued by Cox’s successor, Leon Jaworski. Carroll
Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973
at A01.
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States v. Nixon.66 The Court denied President Nixon’s motion to quash
subpoenas, which were issued by a federal court and had directed
Nixon to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aides and advisors.67 Nixon’s journey to the Court
was a short one. During the criminal investigations, Cox’s subpoena for
the Nixon tapes was issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.68 The President appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, but before the D.C.
Circuit could hear the case, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the case immediately.69 The Court circumvented the normal
process because of “the public importance of the issues presented” and
“the need for their prompt resolution.”70
Because Nixon had cooperated with the prosecutor, the prosecutor
was able to narrow the scope of the subpoena, avoiding a broad
demand for all Nixon’s Oval Office tape recordings and a serious
Executive Privilege problem. In Nixon, the Court described the
subpoena process, including several important characterizations
pertinent to the comparison to President Trump’s approach. It
characterized the subpoena as requiring “the production . . . of certain
tapes, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely
identified meetings between the President and others.”71 This
description suggests that the subpoena was narrowly tailored to specific
tapes and was not a broad demand for all tapes that existed. The Court
also noted that the “Special Prosecutor was able to fix the time, place,
and persons present at these discussions because the White House daily
logs and appointment records had been delivered to him.”72
The Court also pointed out that President Nixon had filed a motion
to quash the subpoenas to accompany his claim of privilege over their
contents.73 A large portion of the Court’s opinion in Nixon is devoted
to the motion to quash analysis. The Court held that subpoenas “may
be quashed if their production would be unreasonable or unproductive,
but not otherwise.”74 The Court outlined three hurdles for the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See generally id.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 686–87.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 700.
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prosecutor to meet to obtain the tapes: relevancy, admissibility, and
specificity.75 The Court determined that the subpoenas at issue had
cleared all three hurdles: Dean’s Senate testimony rendered the tapes
relevant, the Court had decided Executive Privilege did not apply to
potentially criminal conduct, which meant the evidence was admissible,
and the subpoenas’ level of specificity (a product of Nixon’s partial
cooperation) made them reasonable.76 The Court held that there was a
sufficient likelihood that the tapes contained conversations relevant to
the offenses charged in the indictment of Nixon’s associates.77 The
Court also deferred to the district court’s discretion because it was the
best arbiter for deciding whether a subpoena was necessary.78 Although
the Court noted that where a subpoena is directed to the president of
the United States, appellate review should be particularly meticulous,
the Court nevertheless did not establish any heightened standard of
scrutiny for presidential subpoenas.79
The Court then evaluated President Nixon’s claim of Executive
Privilege over the Oval Office tapes.80 Nixon claimed that Executive
Privilege was absolute for all communications as they related to
Executive Branch duties, but he did not claim that Executive Privilege
applied to all of his communications writ large during his presidency.81
In any event, his strategy proved futile. The Supreme Court explicitly
rejected President Nixon’s arguments for absolute, unqualified
presidential immunity from judicial process for all conversations
relating to Executive Branch duties.82 Even for presidential
communications covered by Executive Privilege, the Court found that
“absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive
national security secrets,” it is difficult to accept that “even the very
important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications”
precludes production of evidence to a court of law under a subpoena.83
The Court determined that the public “has a right to every man’s
evidence, except for those persons protected by constitutional,
common law or statutory privilege.”84 The Court passed comment on
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 709.
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the breadth of Nixon’s claim, too: “No case of the Court . . . has
extended this high degree of deference to a President’s generalized
interest in confidentiality.”85 In light of Nixon, President Trump’s far
more expansive requests for deference to his even more generalized
interest in confidentiality demonstrate that the legal system has grown
too weak to impose meaningful accountability on the President, despite
the clarity provided by the Supreme Court decades ago.
B. President Clinton’s Approach
President Clinton also faced multiple investigations into his
conduct over the course of his two terms. Two features of President
Clinton’s approach warrant review. First, President Clinton
cooperated—somewhat extensively—with a series of investigations
that spanned nearly all eight years of his presidency. Second, Clinton’s
claim of absolute immunity from a civil proceeding was resoundingly
rejected in accordance with longstanding precedent.
Civil lawsuits, in tandem with a long-running investigation by
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, spawned legal headaches for
Clinton that ultimately resulted in his impeachment.86 He was first
investigated for connections to Whitewater Development Corporation
and a failed savings and loan company.87 Under the contours of an
independent counsel statute passed in the wake of the Nixon era, a
special judicial panel appointed attorney Kenneth Starr to investigate
the matter.88
Similar to the Senate’s simultaneous hearings on subjects related to
the Nixon criminal investigations, Republicans in Congress voted to
enforce subpoenas for notes taken at joint meetings between the White
House Counsel’s office and Clinton’s private lawyers.89 Although the
White House initially resisted, Clinton ultimately provided the notes,
despite viable claims of attorney-client privilege.90 In fact, both Nixon
and Clinton provided documents in response to subpoenas for
potentially privileged evidence. This pattern continued as the
investigative train rolled through a number of other “scandals” that
85. Id. at 711.
86. Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
143, 143–44 (1998).
87. Id. at 155. The investigation escalated when Deputy White House Counsel Vincent
Foster died by suicide, giving rise to speculation of a coverup. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 156.
90. Id.
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emerged during Clinton’s tenure: “Travelgate,” an investigation into
the dismissal of seven employees at the White House travel office,
“Filegate,” an investigation into delayed production of files by the
White House Counsel’s office, and “Bosniagate,” an investigation into
Clinton’s permission of arms shipments between Iran and Bosnia
without Congressional approval. Other investigations included probes
into campaign finance matters, First Lady Hillary Clinton’s possible
obstruction, and, of course, President Clinton’s extramarital affairs and
his allegedly perjurious comments about them.91 Clinton complied to
some extent with each of these investigations.92
During Clinton’s first term, Paula Jones, a former employee of the
Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, sued him and another
man for sexual harassment during Clinton’s gubernatorial
administration.93 Clinton “promptly advised the District Court that he
intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential
immunity, and requested the court to defer all other pleadings and
motions until after the immunity issue was resolved.”94 The District
Court denied his motion to dismiss, on the grounds that even the most
favorable case for Clinton limited presidential immunity to acts
incidental to the official duties of the presidency.95 The judge did stay
the trial proceedings until after Clinton’s term had ended, but
permitted discovery to continue.96 Clinton appealed to the Eighth
Circuit and lost.97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court was unsparing: “Petitioner’s principal submission—that
‘in all but the most exceptional cases,’ the Constitution affords the
President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out
of events that occurred before he took office—cannot be sustained on
the basis of precedent.”98 The primary concern for presidential
immunity, the Court held, is rooted in the desire to avoid a President
being “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.”99 In short,
91. Id. at 156–60.
92. Id.
93. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684–85 (1997).
94. Id. at 686.
95. See id. at 686 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1997), for the proposition that
the president has “absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of
the official duties of office” but that immunity was not so expansive it gave the president absolute
immunity while in office).
96. Id. at 688.
97. Clinton v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (8th Cir. 1996).
98. Jones, 520 U.S. at 692.
99. Id. at 694 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 752 n. 32 (1974)).
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presidential immunity is meant to empower a President to carry out the
duties of his office without fear of litigation over every official decision
he makes.
That reasoning “provides no support for an immunity for unofficial
conduct,”100 meaning Clinton could not claim presidential immunity for
conduct that had occurred before he became president. Justice Stevens
was particularly explicit in making this point: “[W]e have never
suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that
extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.”101
The Court considered the Founders’ perspectives on presidential
subpoenas and decided that the historical sources were ultimately
inconclusive.102 Nevertheless, Jones stands for the principle that, unless
a suit involves or encroaches upon Executive duties, a president is not
immune from suit merely because a proceeding may upset or distract
him.103
The Court examined the long history of presidential compliance
with legal proceedings to demonstrate that Clinton’s total immunity
argument had little merit. Many examples pepper our nation’s history.
Chief Justice Marshall ruled that it was lawful to subpoena President
Jefferson in the treason trial of Aaron Burr.104 President Monroe
responded to written interrogatories.105 President Grant voluntarily
gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal investigation.106 President Nixon
complied with the subpoena for his Oval Office tapes.107 President Ford
gave a deposition in a criminal trial.108 And Clinton himself had already
been deposed for two criminal proceedings.109
It is important to note what the Court did not decide in Jones: the
Court did not consider whether a comparable claim might succeed in a
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. The Court briefly examined Clinton’s reference to President Jefferson’s protest of a
subpoena for his testimony during the trial of Aaron Burr, but balanced it with Jones’s
counterevidence of comments at the Constitutional Convention that the president is amenable to
the law “in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.” Id. at
695–96.
103. Id. at 701.
104. Id. at 703–04.
105. Id. at 704.
106. Id.
107. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974) (referencing the District Court’s in
camera review of document obtained via subpoena).
108. See United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (requiring President
Ford to give a deposition).
109. Id.
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state tribunal and noted that if the case was being heard in a state
forum, then concerns about federalism, comity, and local prejudice
would arise.110 It was from this small hill President Trump launched his
constitutional battle in Vance, asserting a different kind of total
immunity from subpoenas issued by a state grand jury, despite the logic
of his arguments flying in the face of the reasoning established in Jones
and Nixon.
C. President Trump’s Approach
President Trump went farther than Nixon or Clinton, especially by
claiming total immunity from a criminal investigation because of its
state-level origin. While Trump’s claim was ostensibly grounded in the
fact that the Supreme Court had never addressed whether a state grand
jury could subpoena a sitting president,111 the logic of nearly all Trump’s
arguments applied to federal criminal proceedings, too.112
Trump’s positions in both subpoena cases were rife with
inconsistencies. When House Committees subpoenaed Deutsche Bank
and Mazars in April 2019, Trump contested the move by arguing the
subpoenas had no legislative purpose, amounted to Congress
improperly engaging in “law enforcement,” and violated separation of
powers principles.113 Aside from the inconsistency that Trump was suing
in his private capacity and not as president (and thus no separation of
powers issue had arisen in the traditional sense),114 his argument that
Congress shouldn’t engage in law enforcement was rendered somewhat
illogical when he also opposed a subpoena from traditional law
enforcement—the Manhattan D.A.—for the very same documents.
Turning to a different argument entirely to block that subpoena, Trump,
his businesses, and his family argued that President Trump enjoyed
“absolute immunity” from state criminal process under Article II and
the Supremacy Clause.115 Trump argued that Congress could not play
law enforcement, but also that state law enforcement could not
110. Jones, 520 U.S. at 691.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-3204)
(claiming that Article II and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution dictate that the president
of the United States cannot be subject to criminal process while in office with no rationale
excluding federal criminal process from that assertion (emphasis added)).
113. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2022–32 (2020).
114. Id. at 2034 (stressing that separation of powers concerns were “no less palpable” because
President Trump sued in his personal capacity, but stopping short of accepting the dispute as a
traditional separation of powers problem).
115. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (2020).
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investigate Trump by virtue of his status as president, implicitly
endorsing the view that the only government entity that could
investigate the president is the very branch he himself controls.
At every stage, President Trump’s arguments failed.116 Starting with
the Congressional subpoenas, the D.C. Circuit held that Congress has a
broad ability to investigate pursuant to legislation and that the mere
act of requesting materials relating to a president does not violate
separation of powers principles.117 Evaluating Congress’s Deutsche
Bank subpoena, the Second Circuit similarly concluded that because
the subpoena’s purposes were not pretextual, the Court would defer to
Congress’s assertion that its legislative purpose was valid.118 The court
noted the privacy interests of President Trump “should be accorded
more significance than those of an ordinary citizen because [he] is the
President,” in part because it “risk[s] at least some distraction of the
Nation’s Chief Executive in the performance of his official duties.”119
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit concluded that because claims of
presidential distraction historically have applied narrowly, notably in
both Nixon and Jones,120 it could not justify blocking a subpoena to
third parties—which required no action on Trump’s part—as an
encroachment on his official duties as president.121
The absolute immunity argument against the state grand jury
subpoena fared poorly as well. The District Judge denied Trump’s
initial request to block the subpoena.122 The Second Circuit affirmed,
placing Trump’s arguments in historical context. Importantly, the
Second Circuit’s reasoning mirrors—almost precisely—the Supreme
Court’s ultimate conclusion.123 The Second Circuit began with the

116. See, e.g., Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 652 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1955), for the proposition that inquiry into private affairs—
even of the president—is valid as long as the inquiry is related to a valid legislative purpose);
Trump v. Mazars, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that the “power of the Congress to
conduct investigations . . . is broad” and that it “encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes”).
117. Mazars, 940 F.3d at 733–34.
118. Id.
119. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d at 675.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
123. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (concluding “Two hundred years ago, a
great jurist of our Court established that no citizen, not even the President, is categorically above
the common duty to produce evidence when called upon in a criminal proceeding. We reaffirm
that principle today and hold that the President is neither absolutely immune from state criminal
subpoenas . . . nor entitled to a heightened standard of need.”).
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history:
Over 200 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall . . . upheld the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson. Consistent with
that historical understanding, presidents have been ordered to give
deposition testimony or provide materials in response to subpoenas.
In particular, “the exercise of jurisdiction [over the President] has
been held warranted” when necessary to vindicate public interest in
an ongoing criminal prosecution . . . . The President relies on what
he described at oral argument as “temporary absolute presidential
immunity”—he argues that he is absolutely immune from all stages
of state criminal process while in office . . . . [A]fter reviewing
historical and legal precedent, we conclude . . . that presidential
immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state grand jury
subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged material,
even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to the
President.124

Noticing President Trump’s logical departure from Nixon, the
Second Circuit was troubled by Trump’s failure to assert privilege in
any form.125 Because President Trump’s financial documents were not
privileged, it was hard to imagine they should warrant more protection
than the Nixon tapes, which enjoyed at least a colorable claim of
Executive Privilege.126 Furthermore, the grand jury subpoena was
issued to a third party, not President Trump.127 The Second Circuit
found no support in Nixon for the proposition that a president’s
“private and non-privileged documents may be absolutely shielded”
from scrutiny.128 Trump went 0–3 in his efforts to block both Congress’s
and the grand jury’s subpoenas before reaching the Supreme Court.129
The D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit agreed that Congress’s subpoena
power is broad and that Trump’s arguments for absolute immunity
from state grand juries were unfounded in the law.130 Despite the

124. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
125. See id. at 641 (stressing that Nixon’s claim of Executive Privilege—while unsuccessful—
at least presented a legitimate rationale for quashing the subpoena. President Trump offered no
similar rationale).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 640.
128. See id. (comparing Trump’s argument to the Nixon Court’s conclusion that even
documents exposing the president’s confidential, official conversations may properly be obtained
by subpoena).
129. Vance, 941 F.3d at 631; Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 675 (2d Cir. 2019);
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
130. Vance, 941 F.3d at 631; Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 675 (2d Cir. 2019);
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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apparent lack of a circuit split or even a particularly novel question of
law, the Supreme Court accepted both cases for review and scheduled
them for argument in March 2020—as public interest in Trump’s
financial history continued to grow.131
The arguments in the Vance case did not really present novel
questions of law, beyond the question of whether state grand juries can
subpoena a sitting president. But Trump did not focus his argument so
narrowly: His lawyers argued that Article II and the Supremacy Clause
required that presidential immunity applied to any criminal process,
which implicitly included federal criminal process and thus
contradicted both Nixon and Jones.132 Trump differentiated his claim
from Nixon’s not based on distinctions between federal and state
prosecutors, but on the fact that the Special Prosecutor in Nixon
disclaimed any intent to indict Nixon during his presidency—a
distinction which bears little (if any) resemblance to federalism
principles, comity concerns or Vance’s status as a local state
prosecutor.133 Trump’s concerns about state grand jury subpoenas
encroaching on the office of the president also applied equally to
federal prosecutors.134 The core of Trump’s claim was not that state
prosecutors are uniquely unsuited to investigate a president in our
federalist system, but rather that “issuing compulsory criminal process
to the sitting President, when it is accompanied by a threat of
indictment, crosses a constitutional line.”135
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts punctured that balloon:
“[F]or all that, you don’t argue that the grand jury cannot investigate
the President, do you?”136 President Trump’s counsel dodged the
question by claiming they were not seeking to enjoin the grand jury

131. See Democrat Schiff Questions If Mueller Probing Trump-Deutsche Bank Link,
REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia/democrat-schiffquestions-if-mueller-probing-trump-deutsche-bank-link-idUSKCN1PZ0PU (describing a “wide
investigation into . . . Trump’s financial dealings, including ‘credible reports of money laundering
and financial compromise’”).
132. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19635). In pursuit of this argument, President Trump’s counsel acknowledged President Trump was
being investigated for criminal violations by a state grand jury and claimed subpoenas targeting
the president, even addressed to third parties, violated the Constitution. Id.
133. Brief for Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-3204) at 7.
134. Id. at 5–7. Trump raised the prospects of being indicted while in office, distraction from
official duties, and public stigma and opprobrium resulting from criminal investigation as reasons
to caution against permitting criminal investigations of a sitting president. Each of these logically
applies to federal investigations, too.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
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investigation but were instead arguing for temporary immunity to the
grand jury’s subpoenas.137 The Chief Justice noted the logical problem:
“Well, in other words, it’s okay for the grand jury to investigate, except
it can’t use the traditional and most effective device that grand juries
have typically used to investigate, which is the subpoena?”138
Ultimately, the Court did not overrule decades of precedent in
favor of President Trump’s novel legal theory that subpoenas relating
to the president are invalid when issued by state grand juries. In Vance,
the Court concluded that “Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not
categorically preclude, [n]or require a heightened standard for, the
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.”139 It was
not exactly new precedent—the Court’s holding was consistent with
what it previously held in Nixon and Jones.140 Still, other distinctions
about how the cases unfolded warrant scrutiny.
President Trump never asserted any colorable claim of privilege,
unlike Nixon.141 Trump argued that there should be a heightened
standard for any subpoena issued to the president, which was squarely
inconsistent with the analysis in Nixon,142 in spirit if not in law. With
respect to the evidence, Trump advocated for protections over
unprivileged evidence about unofficial conduct broader than those
Nixon had advocated for. Plus, Nixon sought to protect privileged
evidence relating to official conduct—and Nixon’s claim was
rejected.143 Exacerbating the expansive scope of this new theory was
Trump’s total refusal to cooperate with investigators, which again
differentiated him from Nixon in that it made narrowing the subpoenas
impossible for prosecutors or Congress.144
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (2020).
140. Compare Trump’s argument that presidents are absolutely immune from criminal
process to the holding in Nixon, where the Court concluded that “to read the Art. II powers of
the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to the
enforcement of criminal statutes . . . would upset the constitutional balance of a ‘workable
government.’”; cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997) (“[F]ederal courts have the power to
determine the legality of [the president’s] unofficial conduct.”).
141. See discussion supra notes 65–85 and accompanying text (describing that Nixon asserted
Executive Privilege over tapes of conversations in the Oval Office and lost).
142. See discussion supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text (describing that the Supreme
Court in Nixon said only that meticulous review was warranted for presidential subpoenas but
declined to establish a heightened standard).
143. See discussion supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (describing that Nixon
characterized the president’s claims as the high watermark of presidential immunity—and denied
them—but President Trump’s arguments went much higher).
144. See discussion supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (describing that Nixon offered
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Other distinctions arose from the way the federal courts handled
the Trump cases. The Supreme Court did not expedite hearing over the
issues relating to a criminal investigation involving President Trump,
again departing from Nixon.145 It also entertained his broad
constitutional claim of absolute immunity without requiring him to file
an accompanying motion to quash or asking him to make alternative
arguments in the event his immunity claim failed, as Nixon had.146
Trump tried painstakingly to avoid both the political and legal
implications of Nixon and the logical conclusions emanating from it,
and federal courts allowed him to successfully do so.
While Trump’s legal claim of absolute immunity bore some
similarity to Clinton’s claim in Jones, Trump categorically refused to
cooperate with any investigation into his financial affairs—unlike
Clinton.147 Trump effectively ignored the long line of historical
precedent that supported the Court’s rejection of presidential
immunity in Jones.148 And he ignored the Jones principle that presidents
challenging subpoenas on the grounds they will distract from the office
must show that the subpoena actually encroaches upon the duties of
the presidency. In other words, such challenges cannot be justified by
mere emotional distraction.149
Alarmingly, Trump’s legal contortions continued on past the
Supreme Court. After the Court upheld the subpoenas in Vance, it
White House logs to investigators, allowing prosecutors to subpoena specific tapes instead of the
contents of all Oval Office tapes in Nixon’s possession).
145. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing that the Court expedited
appellate process over Nixon’s claim of Executive Privilege but did not do so for the Manhattan
D.A. subpoena over the President’s financial documents).
146. See discussion supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit noted—
albeit in litigation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance—that a party would ordinarily
challenge a subpoena like the one at issue by filing a motion to quash before the state court that
had impaneled the grand jury. Trump v. Vance, 977 F.3d 198, 207 (2d. Cir. 2020). Such motions
trigger a clear analysis courts regularly undertake. In Trump’s case, it meant he would bear the
burden of coming forward with concrete evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity
accorded to Grand Jury subpoenas, something the Second Circuit noted was “no small feat.” Id.
But Trump never filed a motion to quash in a single case where he opposed subpoenas during his
presidency.
147. See discussion supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (describing that Clinton
complied with several investigations by Congress and prosecutors, turning over potentially
privileged evidence in the process).
148. See discussion supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (describing that the Supreme
Court was explicit in Jones that presidential immunity covers official conduct and that
“distraction” applies only to the official duties of the presidency, not emotional distraction).
149. See discussion supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (describing how discovery in
a civil case that involved President Clinton was not sufficient “distraction” to intrude on his
official duties).
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remanded the case to the District Court for further argument on the
issues of overbreadth, bad faith, and other possible Article II-specific
avenues.150 This District Court heard expedited argument on President
Trump’s new claims that the subpoenas were overbroad or issued in
bad faith. But Trump curiously presented them through a constitutional
claim raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,151 again failing to raise the
straightforward motion to quash through which these new claims
would normally be brought.152 The District Court rejected his
arguments just weeks after the Supreme Court remanded the case in a
lengthy 103-page ruling which articulated frustration with Trump’s
legal tactics:
The President began this action by invoking Article II to raise a
sweeping claim of immunity rejected by every court to consider it.
He then received guidance on potentially valid challenges to the
Mazars Subpoena, including ones specifically tied to Article II, from
no less an authority than the Supreme Court. He . . . raised claims of
bad faith and overbreadth available to the broader public and
conclusorily [sic] asserted that these alleged defects in the grand
jury process violated his Article II rights. The Court is not persuaded
. . . . Justice requires an end to this controversy.153

Trump predictably appealed. More than a year since the issuance of
the criminal subpoena by the grand jury, the Second Circuit again
concluded Trump’s arguments were without merit.154 The court
expressed particular confusion about why he brought a § 1983 claim
and openly suggested that Trump had engaged in peculiar legal tactics
to avoid the harsh motion to quash standard:155
The procedural posture of this case . . . is unusual. A party would
ordinarily challenge a subpoena like the one at issue by filing a
motion to quash before the state court that had impaneled the grand
jury. As noted above, to prevail on an ordinary motion to quash, the
moving party bears the burden to come forward with ‘concrete
evidence’ sufficient to rebut ‘the presumption of validity accorded

150. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2419 (2020).
151. A § 1983 claim is a federal cause of action which provides for civil actions when a
“person . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). President
Trump claimed state prosecutors were depriving him of his constitutional rights as a president by
subpoenaing his accounting firm.
152. Trump v. Vance, No. 19 Civ. 8694, slip op. at 103 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Trump v. Vance, 977 F.3d 198, 207 (2d. Cir. 2020).
155. Id. at 207.
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to Grand Jury subpoenas.156

The Second Circuit later stressed this standard would have
presented Trump with “no small feat.”157 But because Trump made this
other § 1983 claim instead, the District Attorney was forced to file a
motion to dismiss Trump’s claim, reversing the burden.158 The motion
to dismiss standard differs significantly from the motion to quash
standard: The prosecutor’s motion to dismiss would fail if Trump’s
stated facts—which must be presumed as true—presented a viable
claim.159 Under a motion to quash test, however, it would be the
subpoena that enjoys the presumption of validity, and Trump would
bear the burden of demonstrating its bad faith or overbreadth.160 But
Trump contended that presuming the validity of the subpoena, as a
court would under a motion to quash test, would somehow unfairly
impose a heightened pleading standard on him.161 The Second Circuit
flatly disagreed.162 But then it suggested that Trump did not need to
rebut the presumption of validity at this stage, implying that it was
engaging in a mixture of the motion to quash and motion to dismiss
analyses.163 Regardless of this confusion, Trump lost and appealed—
again—to the Supreme Court, where the petition remained
unanswered until February 2021, about eighteen months after the
original issuance of the criminal grand jury subpoena.164 The electorate
did not know whether there were “protracted periods of criminal
conduct” at Trump’s business before the November 2020 election.165
President Trump’s absolutist arguments were not limited to
financial investigations, either. When the House subpoenaed testimony
from former White House Counsel Don McGahn and documents he
possessed in pursuit of an impeachment investigation related to
obstruction of justice,166 McGahn refused to comply unless an
156. Id. at 206–07.
157. Id. at 207.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. See id. (“We disagree.”).
163. Id.
164. Arian de Vogue, Supreme Court allows release of Trump tax returns to NY prosecutor,
CNN (Feb. 22, 2021 3:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/22/politics/supreme-court-trumptaxes-vance/index.html.
165. William K. Rashbaum & Benjamin Weiser, D.A. is Investigating Trump and His
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2020),
Company
Over
Fraud,
Filing
Suggests,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/nyregion/donald-trump-taxes-cyrus-vance.html.
166. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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accommodation was reached with the White House.167 Trump argued
that certain White House advisors enjoy total immunity from
compelled testimony about matters relating to their service of the
president.168 The ensuing battle, which presented a closer constitutional
question about Executive Privilege and presidential immunity, still
provided important guidance that will be relevant to remedies
considered in Part III.
The House brought suit to enforce the subpoena and won in
District Court, but a three-judge panel at the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed on the grounds the House Committee lacked
standing to sue.169 The full D.C. Circuit later reversed the panel
decision, determining after en banc review that the House did in fact
have standing.170 The D.C. Circuit noted that when the House of
Representatives employs its subpoena power in service of its
impeachment power, then a subpoena to White House aides for
testimony is an enforceable demand for information, and questions of
Executive Privilege must be raised and litigated separately—again
rejecting President Trump’s claim of absolute immunity for an
approach that bore closer resemblance to typical American legal
procedure.171
Importantly, the original panel at the D.C. Circuit—after receiving
the case on remand—ruled that there was no cause of action for the
House to pursue subpoenas in court, rendering enforcement of the
subpoena impossible despite the House’s standing to bring the suit.172
The decision was grounded in the fact that Congress has “granted an
express cause of action to the Senate—but not to the House” for
enforcing subpoenas through civil litigation.173 While Congressional
lawyers insisted that a federal court could grant equitable relief on its
own under Article III, the panel disagreed with that, too: The existence
of the statutory power in the Senate implies courts cannot infer it for
the House.174 The court also expressed reluctance at characterizing an
“interbranch information dispute” between branches of government as
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(en banc).
171. Id. at 765.
172. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 973 F.3d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(on remand from reh’g en banc).
173. See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365(b)).
174. Id. at 123–24.
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a traditional equitable claim.175 The panel pointed out that the line of
cases used in support of equitable relief all cited statutory powers, not
constitutional ones like impeachment.176
It is clear the D.C. Circuit struggled with constitutional questions
about enforcing Congressional subpoenas to the Executive Branch.
The judges cited the fact that Congress’s power to enforce subpoenas
is currently limited to two avenues: a statutory criminal contempt
mechanism and the inherent congressional contempt power.177
According to the panel, because Congress had not passed legislation
creating a civil subpoena enforcement power for the House, it had
none.178 Critically, the panel practically invited legislators to take up the
cause: “We note that this decision does not preclude Congress (or one
of its chambers) from ever enforcing a subpoena in federal court; it
simply precludes it from doing so without first enacting a statute
authorizing such a suit.”179 McGahn’s testimony has still not been
received by the House of Representatives.
President Trump’s legal tactics, combined with his public and
private obstruction of the Special Counsel investigation, blocked
multiple branches of government from critical evidence related to his
conduct. Part III dives deeper into particularly problematic aspects of
President Trump’s approach to subpoenas. It also presents several
courses of action to remedy the confusion that resulted from the
Special Counsel investigation, Trump’s exploitation of deference to the
presidency in courts of law, and the lack of a clear statutory scheme for
subpoenas issued to the president. These shortcomings (among others)
allowed Trump to argue for temporary absolute immunity, despite 200
years of contrary precedent. While President Trump ultimately lost
each legal battle, he won a war Nixon and Clinton never did: preventing
evidence from being disclosed until his presidency was over. Trump
even ran for reelection while the evidence remained blocked and the
175. Id. at 124.
176. See id. at 125. The panel in McGahn detailed the issues in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 174 (1927), which it distinguished because it “arose out of a habeas corpus suit filed after
the Senate exercised its inherent contempt power to arrest the Attorney General’s brother.”
McGahn, 973 F.3d at 125. It used a similar distinction to dismiss the citation of another case,
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1955), which suggested Congress has “the authority
to compel testimony” through “its own processes”—for the proposition that the “power of
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.” McGahn, 973 F.3d at 125.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 125–26 (emphasis added).

DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

172

3/14/2021 4:26 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 16

electorate uninformed about his possible criminal conduct.
Chief Justice Roberts’ struggle with President Trump’s theory of
presidential immunity was rooted in the fact that its contours “would
seem to go much farther than resisting the subpoena.”180 Roberts
expressed skepticism about the logic of President Trump’s propositions:
“I don’t know why you don’t resist the investigation in its entirety or
why your theory wouldn’t lead to that.”181 Trump’s attorney dodged,182
but Roberts was nudging Trump’s attorneys to state their position: They
objected to any and all investigations of a sitting president. It is this
position that, more than anything, transposed President Trump’s
political approach onto his legal one. His lawyers contorted to make
arguments that flew in the face of Nixon and Jones and countless other
cases in order to appease a client who, like a king, would not accept any
authority other than his own.
III. PREVENTING FUTURE TRUMPS
The common refrain against impeachment is that the proper means
of removing a president is an election. Setting aside the merits of that
position, it nevertheless relies on an assumption that voters will have
adequate information to make a sound judgment about the president’s
performance, character, and abilities. When the president withholds
critical information from the public, he gravely inhibits the electorate’s
power to hold him accountable through the traditional political process.
In short, President Trump’s tactics exposed major flaws in the system.
Three reforms could resolve some of these problems. First,
Congress should amend Special Counsel regulations to create a direct
channel between a Special Counsel investigating the president and
Congress or the public to avoid confusion and subsequent subpoenas
arising from multiple corners of the government. Second, Congress
should modify the deference that a president receives in federal court
by creating a cause of action for presidents to pursue when appearing
in their personal capacity to oppose subpoenas. It was abundantly clear
that many of President Trump’s arguments would fail, yet broad
deference to his claims afforded by way of his office permitted him to
delay investigations into his conduct with expansive and unsupported
180. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635).
181. Id.
182. See id. (“Well, our – our position is that criminal process against the President – and
that’s what we’re talking about, that’s what’s before the Court – criminal process targeting the
President is a violation of the Constitution.”).
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arguments. Third, Congress should pass new laws to govern its authority
to investigate presidents and Executive Branch officials, a power
federal courts have already recognized Congress possesses with respect
to subpoenas. The status-quo, which allowed President Trump to
disable investigation after investigation, failed in that it neither
provided effective oversight nor served the interest of keeping the
public informed. The United States needs better law for presidential
investigations.
A. Fixing the Special Counsel Regulations
Public frustration over Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation cut
in both ideological directions. Republicans complained that Mueller
pursued too many of President Trump’s associates on charges unrelated
to a conspiracy with Russia to interfere in the 2016 election. Democrats
alleged that Mueller left many Trump-Russia stones unturned by failing
to investigate Trump’s finances and alleged misconduct by Trump’s
family members.183 The media criticized Mueller as well. Indeed, the
New York Times hypothesized that Mueller was fearful he might
“endanger [his] own image by expressing a forthright view of [Trump’s
conduct], even if the future of the Republic might be at stake.”184
Since Watergate, there have been two modes of special inquiry into
presidential misconduct—both of which have elicited criticism.185 The
first kind of inquiry is performed by an Independent Counsel, like Ken
Starr, who operates outside the Executive Branch and answers to the
judiciary and Congress.186 The second kind is a Special Counsel, like
Mueller. Special Counsels work under a regulatory scheme meant to
secure a level of independence, but because they answer to the
Attorney General, they effectively remain under the control of the
president.187 Special Counsels report their findings only to the Attorney
General and no one else.188 There is no provision in the regulations for
direct communications to the public or Congress—except for
183. See Bob Bauer, It’s Time to Reform the Special-Counsel Rules—Again, THE ATLANTIC
(June 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/mueller-and-comey-were-verydifferent-special-counsels/590836/ (critiquing Muller’s investigation as a “confusing, half-in and
half-out analysis of possible obstruction of justice”).
184. The Editorial Board, Decoding Robert Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/opinion/robert-mueller-trump.html.
185. Bauer, supra note 183 and accompanying text.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 28 CFR § 600.8 (limiting communications by the Special Counsel to solely the Attorney
General).
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communications made by the Attorney General.189
Both types of Counsel have been met with harsh criticism. The
Independent Counsel statute, which was passed in the wake of Nixon’s
firing of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Special
Counsel Archibald Cox,190 provided a broad mandate for a panel of
judges from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to appoint a special
prosecutor if the Attorney General deemed it necessary.191 In 1998,
Justice Scalia excoriated the law as unconstitutional in his dissenting
opinion in Morrison v. Olson.192 Scalia believed the independent
counsel statute should be struck down because criminal prosecution is
an exercise of “purely executive power” to be exclusively controlled by
the president—not any other branch of government.193 The
Independent Counsel statute also elicited political critiques: The
Clinton investigation cost $40 million and polled poorly among the
American public.194 Ultimately Congress permitted the independent
counsel law to expire on June 30, 1999.195
Separate from the Independent Counsel statute are the Special
Counsel regulations, which the Department of Justice adopted just
after the Independent Counsel statute had expired.196 The regulations
require an appointment of a non-government person in sensitive cases,
and only the Attorney General can dismiss the Special Counsel.197
Additionally, the Special Counsel can only be dismissed “for cause”:
misconduct, dereliction of duty, or other good cause.198 Political reasons
189. 28 CFR § 600.9 (providing for communications to Congress by the Attorney General
about Special Counsel investigations).
190. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 94-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). As the
Watergate investigation ramped up, Archibald Cox prepared to issue subpoenas to President
Nixon for Oval Office tapes. Nixon ordered his Attorney General to fire Cox. The Attorney
General resigned. Nixon then ordered his Deputy Attorney General to fire Cox, and instead, he
resigned. Solicitor General Robert Bork eventually carried out the order. Carroll Kilpatrick,
Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973 at A01.
191. Id.
192. See 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that while “issues of this sort”
sometimes come before the court “clad in sheep’s clothing . . . this wolf comes as a wolf”).
193. Id. at 734.
194. Independent Probes of Clinton Administration cost nearly $80 million, CNN (Apr. 1,
1999), https://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/01/counsel.probe.costs/.
195. Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PBS (May 1998),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/history.html.
196. 28 CFR § 600 (2020).
197. 28 CFR § 600.7(d). However, the recent Special Counsel appointment of U.S. Attorney
for Connecticut John Durham to investigate the origins of the Mueller Investigation did not
comply with this provision, raising questions about what the phrase “outside the government”
means.
198. Id.

DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/14/2021 4:26 PM

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY, SPECIAL COUNSEL REFORMS, & TRUMP

175

alone would not carry the day.199 Although these protections would
appear to shield any Special Counsel from political interference,
Mueller’s top deputy stated that Mueller had resisted investigating
President Trump’s finances for fear of being fired.200 While the Special
Counsel regulations make clear that removal can only be for cause and
issued by the Attorney General, the regulations are not statutory law
and President Trump could have conceivably ordered the Attorney
General to rescind them, and then fired Mueller.201 Trump could also
simply have found a contrived reason to fire Mueller for cause, or
circumvented the Justice Department regulations on the grounds that
they do not apply to him, fired Mueller, and triggered a legal battle over
his authority to go around them after Mueller was gone.202 The Special
Counsel’s office was acutely aware of these potential outcomes, and
Mueller’s deputy highlighted that “[w]e still do not know if there are
other financial ties between the president and either the Russian
government or Russian oligarchs” as a result of the fears that the
investigation would be terminated prematurely.203
According to Mueller’s deputy, Special Counsels face a number of
obstacles when investigating a president: namely, the pardon power, the
Attorney General’s control over the appointment, and the fact that
every person has constitutional rights to respond to charges of
criminality in court, which presidents cannot do because current Justice
Department policy prohibits them from being indicted.204 The deputy’s
199. Id.
200. During the Special Counsel probe, former federal prosecutor Andrew Weissman was
hired by Mueller to serve as his deputy for the prosecution of Trump’s campaign chair, Paul
Manafort. According to Weissman, early in the investigation shortly after the discovery of a June
2016 meeting between President Trump’s son, son-in-law, and campaign manager and Russians
inside Trump Tower, the team was informed they Mueller would be fired the following day. While
the firing never came to fruition, the team was warned several times in 2017 that Trump was
preparing to fire Mueller. Weissman says Mueller, as a result of the threats, came to believe the
investigation should be narrowly focused on Russian election interference operations and seen
through to its conclusion, even if it meant backing away from other important questions and
ultimately leaving them unanswered. ANDREW WEISSMAN, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: INSIDE THE
MUELLER INVESTIGATION 112–17 (2020).
201. Matthew Nussbaum, Can Trump fire Mueller? Yup, and in more ways than one,
POLITICO (Jun. 13, 2017 3:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/13/can-trump-firespecial-counsel-robert-mueller-239500.
202. It was reported that Trump claimed conflicts of interest over a fee dispute regarding
Mueller’s membership at a Trump golf club to White House lawyers in an early attempt to oust
Mueller from his position. Josh Gerstein, DOJ releases part of Mueller’s conflict of interest waiver,
POLITICO (Sept. 14, 2019 11:13 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/14/justice-deptmueller-conflict-of-interest-1496171.
203. Id.
204. See id. (noting that a current Department of Justice opinion states that a sitting president
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warnings proved prescient. President Trump pardoned Michael Flynn,
Paul Manafort, Roger Stone, and George Papadopoulos—each of
whom was charged or convicted, or who pleaded guilty in the
investigation.205 Despite Mueller concluding that, in four instances,
President Trump’s conduct met all elements of the crime of obstruction
of justice, Attorney General Bill Barr, who introduced the conclusions
of the report to the public, said that Mueller “did not reach a conclusion
on whether Trump obstructed justice” and that he and Deputy
Attorney General Rosenstein independently concluded that Trump
had not.206 Mueller told Attorney General Barr that he had distorted
his team’s conclusions with his public statements.207 But during
testimony to Congress, Mueller remained reticent to conclude
President Trump committed a crime—lending credence to the idea that
Special Counsels struggle with the policy that presidents cannot be
indicted in a court of law.208
More effective and formal communication between independent or
special investigators and the public is warranted, and Congress or the
Department of Justice should provide for this in existing regulations.
Even though Mueller’s investigation did not generate the
constitutional showdown that other Trump-related probes did, it is
critical to keep in mind that subpoenas by Congress and a state
prosecutor’s office were necessary for two primary reasons. First, there
was widespread confusion about what exactly Mueller was
investigating. And second, Mueller was hesitant to pursue Trump’s
cannot be indicted).
205. Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump.
206. Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks on the Release of the Report on the
Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr.
18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarksrelease-report-investigation-russian.
207. After the submission of Report of the Special Counsel on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election and Obstruction of Justice, Attorney General Barr
held a press conference and sent a letter to Congress claiming the investigation did not establish
criminal wrongdoing by President Trump. Robert Mueller then wrote a letter to Attorney
General Barr stating his remarks “did not fully capture the context, nature, and substance of this
Office’s work and conclusions.” Letter to the Honorable William Barr, Re: Report of the Special
Counsel on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election and
OF
JUSTICE
(Mar.
27,
2019),
Obstruction
of
Justice,
DEP’T
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/30/718883130/mueller-complained-that-barr-summary-of-trumprussia-probe-lacked-context.
208. See discussion supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that Department of Justice
regulations prohibit the indictment of a sitting president, preventing Special Counsels from
accusing them of crimes because they cannot give presidents the chance to confront the charges
in court).
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financial information largely because of Trump’s influence over
Mueller’s own appointment. Had Mueller been required to submit
updates or discuss the investigation publicly in testimony to Congress
or brief announcements through the Justice Department, then the
public would have had a greater understanding of the investigation, and
Congress and other prosecutors might have known to pursue financial
leads sooner. Investigations of presidents are, at least in some part,
about ensuring that voters have enough information to make an
informed decision about whether a president deserves their political
support. Some critics might argue that a public-facing Special Counsel
would create a circus like the Clinton Independent Counsel had,209 but
there is a reasonable middle ground between Mueller’s total silence
and Starr’s numerous press conferences.
Special Counsel testimony to a Congressional committee in threemonth intervals would help ensure that a Special Counsel’s work is not
being curtailed by the president or, if it is, that any obstructive behavior
is presented to voters. Testimony should focus on the broad contours of
the status of an investigation and answering questions about whether
certain steps will or will not be pursued, subject to sensitivity
protections regarding ongoing criminal proceedings. If the public,
Congress, or the Manhattan D.A. had known earlier that Mueller
concluded Trump had obstructed justice, or that the Special Counsel
team was not pursuing financial leads, or that Mueller intended to
abide by Justice Department policy not to indict a sitting president, the
investigations of the Trump era might have been remarkably more
efficient.
B. Reforming Presidential Deference in Federal Courts
Next is the issue of President Trump’s constitutional claims. Trump
did not just take advantage of Supreme Court deference to the
Executive Branch in subpoena cases, he abused it. His convoluted
arguments alleging absolute immunity from state grand jury subpoenas
or claiming that he was entitled to a heightened standard for any
subpoena involving him contradicted the holdings of both Nixon and
Jones. Courts did not expedite hearings like they did for Nixon’s
appeals. And Trump’s failures to file straightforward claims caused

209. Joe Concha, Joe Lockhart praises Mueller, while slamming Starr for holding press
conferences, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2019 11:40 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/433220-joelockhart-praises-mueller-while-slamming-starr-for-holding-press.
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(and continue to cause) judicial confusion.210
President Trump’s argument in Vance that he was absolutely
immune from criminal process rested on shaky ground from the outset.
The Vance decision reads as a recitation of Nixon and Jones, primarily
because Trump’s arguments had effectively ignored both cases: In
Vance, the Court concluded that “Article II and the Supremacy Clause
do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard, for the
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.”211 One new
element the Court could have considered worthy of analysis in Vance
might have been whether state prosecutors—but not federal ones—
were precluded from investigating a president on federalism grounds.
Recall that in Jones, the Supreme Court noted that it would not address
whether a president should be amenable to legal process in state court,
which would raise questions about federalism, local prejudice and
comity concerns.212 And, to his credit, President Trump did raise some
political arguments questioning the wisdom of allowing local
prosecutors across the country—often elected themselves—to pursue
criminal investigations of a sitting president.213 But most of Trump’s
arguments could be logically applied to both federal and state
prosecutors, suggesting acceptance of his argument would require at
least some reversal of Nixon.214 Moreover, Vance did not spend much
time addressing federalism or local prejudice, since the core of Trump’s
claim was not that state prosecutors are uniquely unsuited to
investigate a president but rather that compulsory criminal process to
the sitting President crosses a constitutional line when it is not
accompanied by a promise not to indict him.215 The logical extension of
Trump’s arguments to federal investigations raises questions about why
the Supreme Court allowed Trump to recycle rejected presidential
claims.
The Court’s final pronouncement in Vance clearly reaffirmed
210. President Trump filed subsequent constitutional claims over the subpoenas by the
Manhattan D.A. instead of filing a straightforward motion to quash. See discussion supra notes
150–165 and accompanying text.
211. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (2020).
212. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 704 (1997).
213. Trump argued that States and localities often “disagree with choices made by the
President,” like decisions about deploying federal resources, and that the prospect of states and
localities registering that disagreement through investigations could inhibit the president from
fully performing his presidential duties. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct.
2412 at 10 (No. 19-3204).
214. See discussion supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.
215. Brief for Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-3204) at 9.
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Nixon: “[N]o citizen, not even the President, is categorically above the
common duty to produce evidence when called upon in a criminal
proceeding.”216 Chief Justice Roberts, the author of the majority
opinion, relied on “two hundred years” of support for that
conclusion.217 President Trump’s hodgepodge of inconsistent
arguments—many of which contradicted centuries of precedent—
should not have warranted deference presidents typically receive in
federal court. Courts also permitted Trump to advocate for a
heightened standard for presidential subpoenas, something that Nixon
almost explicitly foreclosed.218 Remember, too, that President Nixon
moved to quash the subpoena issued for his Oval Office tapes219;
something which Trump has still not done to date. Instead of presenting
arguments courts typically assess, Trump raised a blanket claim of
presidential immunity similar to the one rejected in Jones, based on
arguments similar to the ones rejected in that case.
Courts bear some responsibility for allowing Trump to delay
proceedings without filing straightforward claims. Recall that the Nixon
Court fast-tracked President Nixon’s attempt to quash the subpoena
for his Oval Office tapes past the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and
straight to the Supreme Court in recognition of “the public importance
of the issues presented and the need for their prompt resolution.”220
The Vance Court made no similar decision. Instead, it slow-walked
President Trump’s attempt to block criminal investigations into his
conduct. In fact, the Supreme Court delayed hearing the case: Oral
argument was originally scheduled for March 2020 but was delayed two
months because of the COVID-19 pandemic.221 While this was an
understandable delay, the case was still only heard after six others
presented before it.222 Further delay after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Vance when the case was remanded presents questions, too: after the
Second Circuit’s second rejection of Trump’s request to block the grand
jury subpoena using the unusual § 1983 claim, Trump’s emergency
petition to the Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal of that
216. Id. at 2431.
217. Id.
218. See discussion supra Part II.A.
219. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974).
220. Id. at 686–87.
221. Devin Dwyer, Coronavirus Forces Supreme Court to Delay Cases to Protect Health of
Justices, Attorneys, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/coronavirusforces-supreme-court-delay-cases-protect-health/story?id=69620103.
222. Calendar
of
Events
May
2020,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/events/2020-05/ (last accessed Feb. 22, 2021).
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decision sat for four months before it was denied without hearing.223 It
is unclear why the current Supreme Court waited so long and did not
view the ongoing criminal investigation into President Trump with the
same urgency that a previous Court had viewed the indictment and trial
of President Nixon’s associates. But reason cautions against courts
selectively weighing the public import of a criminal investigations
involving a president because it would invite judges to make what could
fairly be characterized as a political decision.
The Supreme Court also had opportunities to ask Trump to present
claims rooted in existing law and could have demanded that Trump file
a motion to quash to accompany his claim of absolute immunity.224 The
Court could have asked the parties to address supplemental issues that
would remain at stake in Vance in the event Trump’s arguments for
absolute immunity had failed. In fact, the Court took care to issue a
supplemental question before the oral argument in Vance at the request
of Justice Kavanaugh, who wanted to know whether the political
question doctrine prohibited the case from adjudication in federal
courts.225 Instead of demanding that Trump make legal arguments
supported by existing law, the Court left these legitimate claims
unaddressed for more than a year.226 Trump’s novel claim—made in his
private capacity—received too much deference in federal court.
Congress and courts can and should adjust deference given to
presidents appearing in their private capacity and making claims not
rooted in existing law to block subpoenas. Courts should not end all
deference to presidents appearing in their private capacity. Even in his
position as a private citizen, the president deserves additional legal
rights as the occupant of one of the most demanding offices in the
country. But deference to the president and deference to unsupported
legal theories are two entirely different principles.
Three possible changes, which could be made through a
Congressional statute creating a cause of action for presidents to
challenge subpoenas in federal court, would foster more efficient and

223. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Denies Trump’s Final Bid to Block Release of Financial
Records, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2021 11:11 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/us/supremecourt-trump-taxes-financial-records.html.
224. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020).
225. Amy Howe, Justices Ask For More Briefing in Trump Tax-Returns Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/justices-ask-for-morebriefing-in-trump-tax-returns-cases/.
226. Trump v. Vance, No. 19 Civ. 8694, slip op. at 103 (2020) (emphasis added).

DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/14/2021 4:26 PM

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY, SPECIAL COUNSEL REFORMS, & TRUMP

181

legally sound proceedings in this arena.227 First, the statute could
mandate a higher level of scrutiny for any presidential lawsuit to block
a lawful subpoena made in a president’s private capacity that does not
state an existing doctrine of law, like a privilege, as its basis. Second, the
statute could mandate that any case involving criminal grand jury
subpoenas relating to a president should be considered a matter of
public import and expedited through the appellate process. Third,
where a president lodges a constitutional claim not currently
recognized by law, courts could require the parties to address additional
claims that will likely arise later in the proceeding, like overbreadth or
bad faith. Since the constitutional question of whether a sitting
president can be subject to subpoena by federal and state grand juries
and Congress has been squarely answered in the affirmative, a new
statute regulating proceedings on this issue should withstand
constitutional muster as long as it does not violate any president’s
constitutional rights.228
These changes might invite criticism that the courts would be
dragged too readily into political investigations or that Congress risks
a dramatic increase in investigation of sitting presidents. But they
would also foster expeditious oversight of the head of the Executive
Branch and avoid re-litigation of these issues every two decades. And
judges can usually separate the goats from the sheep: If investigators
begin harassing presidents, judges can toss subpoenas out or Congress
could amend the law. Congress is not powerless to remedy the problems
President Trump exposed in fighting presidential subpoenas—and
should further codify its power as discussed in the next section.
227. The constitutionality of such a law would surely be subject to debate, much of which
would depend on its language. However, a number of cases suggest that if Congress passed a law
regulating procedure of federal claims made by presidents in their personal capacity to block
subpoenas, it would fall within its constitutional authority to regulate Article III courts. See, e.g.,
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (holding that Congress can validly amend constitutional law
with a regulation on remedies as long as it does not violate a constitutional rule); United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872) (holding that Congress is only prohibited from commanding
unconstitutional outcomes when regulating Article III cases); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 50 U.S. 647 (1850) (holding that where Congress passes a constitutional
statute which falls within the ambit of its authority, the statute’s consequences are permitted to
be inconsistent with previous federal law as long as they do not violate constitutional law). There
is even a viable argument that by creating a cause of action for a president to seek immediate
judicial review of any subpoena—but, of course, imposing no heightened standards on such
review—the law would actually benefit presidents, not harm them. Whether creating a specific
cause of action for presidents itself inherently imposes a heightened standard presents a thornier
question for another paper.
228. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (holding that Congress can validly amend
constitutional law with regulation as long as it honors constitutional rules).
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C. Creating a Congressional Statute for Presidential Subpoenas
One truth the Trump presidency revealed is that Americans are
wary of impeachment.229 Yet impeachment remains the primary
mechanism to exercise oversight of the president. During the Supreme
Court’s recitation of historical evidence in Jones, it pointed to remarks
by James Wilson, delegate to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, who stated that the president, “far from being above the
laws,” is “amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in
his public character by impeachment.”230 With the decisions of Mazars
and McGahn affirming that Congress has a constitutional subpoena
power and the standing to pursue it in federal court when it legislates
rules for doing so, Congress should codify the House of
Representatives’ subpoena powers against the president into federal
law.
What would such a statute look like? Look no further than Trump
v. Mazars.231 In Mazars, although the Court explicitly rejected
President Trump’s demand for a heightened standard to restrict
Congressional subpoenas for presidential evidence,232 it set forth a fourpart test for courts to use when evaluating the lawfulness of a
Congressional subpoena to a president. That test offers guidance for a
new House subpoena statute. First, the law should require any
subpoena to be accompanied by a legislative purpose that warrants the
significant step of involving the president and his evidence.233 Second,
the law should demand that a House committee tailors the subpoena
so it is no broader than necessary—the more specific, the better.234
Third, the law should require detailed and substantial evidence in
support of whatever legislative purpose is cited in justification for the
subpoena.235 Fourth, the law should mandate that each subpoena
include a careful assessment of the burdens imposed on the president

229. See discussion infra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing polling which showed
that Americans were evenly divided on the issue of impeachment regardless of evidence
presented).
230. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 696 (1997).
231. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2036 (2020) (creating a four-part test
for the enforcement of congressional subpoenas for information relating to the private papers of
the president).
232. Id. at 2032 (holding that the request the House establish a “demonstrated, specific need”
for information or show that it is “critical” to its purpose would “seriously risk impeding Congress
in carrying out its responsibilities”).
233. Id. at 2035.
234. Id. at 2036.
235. Id.
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by the subpoena and an explanation for why there are no less invasive
means of obtaining the information.236
The law could follow the lead of similar statutes and include
exemptions and exceptions mentioned in the McGahn case: other
compulsory statutes exempt persons testifying on matters of
governmental privilege;237 previous statutes created a limited form of
immunity for individuals about facts they were compelled to testify
upon to Congress.238 The new statute should also create an enforcement
mechanism for subpoenas issued by any House Committee as discussed
by the D.C. Circuit in McGahn.239 No matter what the final result looks
like, it is evident from Mazars and McGahn that federal courts would
accept a statute codifying the House’s ability to subpoena the president
or Executive Branch officials and an accompanying cause of action to
enforce subpoenas for presidential papers, White House testimony, and
Executive Branch evidence.
When President Trump was impeached on charges of abuse of
power and obstruction of Congress just six months after Mueller
testified publicly,240 Americans were divided on the question of whether
Trump should be impeached and removed from office.241 Intriguingly,
more Americans approved of impeachment charges than approved his
conviction and removal on those same charges.242 This distinction
suggests Americans are less wary of the House of Representatives
investigating presidential wrongdoing than they are of the Senate
removing the president from office. Yet the House was unable to
compel testimony from a number of individuals—including McGahn—
236. Id.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2018).
238. See, e.g., In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 665 n.1 (1897) (holding that “[n]o person
examined and testifying before either house of congress, or any committee of either house, shall
be held to answer criminally in any court of justice”).
239. U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 973 F.3d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
240. Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H. R. Res. 755, 116th Cong.
(2019).
241. Gallup, one of the most reputable polling institutions in the United States, found that 46
percent of Americans favored Trump’s conviction and removal, compared to 33 percent who
favored President Clinton’s conviction and removal in 1999. Frank Newport, Impeachment from
(Jan.
24,
2020),
the
American
Public’s
Perspective,
GALLUP
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/284030/impeachment-american-publicperspective.aspx. The same poll demonstrated that American opinions on impeachment of
President Trump largely tracked their approval or disapproval of his job performance. However,
it also found that deviation was higher among those who disapproved of Trump’s job performance
as president than those who approved, indicating there is a higher bar for conviction and removal
of a president than his acquittal. Id.
242. Id.
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in its impeachment proceeding, and critical evidence pertinent to
Trump’s guilt or innocence went unheard.243
The House should remedy problems that enabled its own
shortcomings in Executive Branch oversight. It is notable that the D.C.
Circuit again vacated the second judgment denying the House’s
petition to enforce the subpoena in McGahn and scheduled another en
banc rehearing. This suggests that the full court of appeals may not
agree with the panel’s conclusion that the House must pass a law
creating a cause of action to enforce subpoenas in federal court.244
Regardless of whether it overrules the conclusion that a statutory cause
of action is required, the House should address the problems with
presidential subpoenas anyway. While Americans may view
impeachment as divisive, instances of presidential misconduct are not
going to decrease in the modern era where electronic communication
and advancements in technology have created a wider array of
evidence for investigators. Instead of resisting these changes, the
House—and, where appropriate, the Senate—would do well to
confront this issue head on and adjust Congress’s system of presidential
oversight accordingly.
CONCLUSION
President Nixon said, “I welcome this kind of examination because
people have got to know whether or not their president’s a crook. Well,
I’m not a crook.”245 He publicly welcomed investigations, even if he
resisted them privately, in the hopes of being seen as a politician
beyond reproach.246 Implicit in the historic dance between presidents
and their investigators is the tension between resistance and
cooperation. Two poles—a president’s desire to avoid implication of
wrongdoing on one end and the public’s interest in obtaining
information about a president’s conduct on the other—demand
243. Spencer Hsu and Anne Marminow, Former White House Counsel Don McGahn does
not have to testify to House, appeals court finds, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2020 5:38 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/former-white-house-counsel-don-mcgahndoes-not-have-to-testify-to-house-appeals-court-finds/2020/02/28/eb846412-3c5a-11ea-bacaeb7ace0a3455_story.html.
244. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, No. 19-5331, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32573, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15, 2020).
245. Cokie Roberts & Steve Inskeep, A History of Presidential Tax Returns, NPR: MORNING
EDITION (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/15/695054845/a-history-of-presidentialtax-returns.
246. See id. (noting that President Nixon’s tax returns were in fact leaked by someone at the
IRS, leading to his insistence that he was not a crook).
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compromise between powerful forces in a decentralized government.
But President Trump did not accept this reality. From the outset, Trump
denounced any investigation into his conduct as a witch hunt, openly
obstructed investigators, and resisted authority at every turn.247 His
conduct betrayed the notion that a president would always want to be
viewed as cooperative and truthful, the foundation of compromise
between presidents and investigators.
President Trump should not be faulted for fighting investigations
into his conduct in federal court, since many presidents in history have
pushed back against investigators. But other presidents accepted the
letter and the logic of the law. They did not employ roundabout ways
of contesting precedent on presidential investigations. By doing both,
Trump challenged the very principles of oversight that underpin the
constitutional system. His use of arguments that exceeded the scope of
his claims, ignorance of the logical application of Nixon and Jones,
avoidance of arguments rooted in existing law, and rejection of States
and Congress as separate branches of government present separate but
equally dangerous approaches that future presidents could build upon.
If no adjustments are made, successful delays of the transmission of
presidential evidence will continue, and courts will be left reminding
presidents that they are not kings248 as they review new iterations of the
same recycled arguments again and again.
During President Trump’s tenure, multiple judges came to the
conclusion that the president is not a king, implicitly or explicitly.249 It
is true that in some cases, Trump’s lawsuits presented novel questions
of law, like Mazars which raised the issue of whether Congress could
pursue a presidential investigation absent an impeachment inquiry (it

247. Cheyenne Haslett and Jordyn Phelps, Trump attacks Mueller for continuing ‘Phony
Witch Hunt’ day after Manafort accused of lying, ABC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018 3:22 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-attacks-mueller-day-manafort-accusedlying/story?id=59439963; Erin Durkin, Trump attacks ‘disgraced’ Mueller and rails against ‘phony’
obstruction claims, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2018 10:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/aug/20/trump-mueller-obstruction-russia-investigation-phony.
248. See McGahn, supra at note 6, at 213 (pointing out that the “primary takeaway from the
past 250 years of recorded American history is that Presidents are not kings” in response to
President Trump’s argument that courts had no authority to enforce House subpoenas).
249. See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035 (2020) (rejecting Trump’s claim that
presidents were immune from Congressional oversight absent an impeachment inquiry); Trump
v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (rejecting Trump’s claim that presidents were totally
immune from state grand jury subpoenas); Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d
148, 213 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting Trump’s claim that courts cannot enforce Congressional
subpoenas by pointing out that presidents are not kings).
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could).250 And the Court did create a new avenue for presidents to
challenge Congressional subpoenas.251 But the Vance case offered no
similar major development in presidential investigations law; rather, it
reads as a recitation of Nixon and Jones. That is because it was
abundantly clear that there is no total immunity for a sitting president
from a grand jury subpoena. The Court’s final words in Vance are little
more than a time warp to Nixon: “[N]o citizen, not even the President,
is categorically above the common duty to produce evidence when
called upon in a criminal proceeding.”252 For the country to survive
another decade, let alone another 243 years, no president should be
permitted to disrupt oversight so expansively again by employing
political and legal claims that ignore this logic and precedent.
Preventing such abuse requires improved Special Counsel regulations,
less deference to presidents appearing in their personal capacity, and a
statutory scheme that guides Congressional subpoenas to presidents.
These solutions offer clear remedies to presidential abuse of the legal
system without jeopardizing the American constitutional framework,
and they present a pathway back toward holding the president
accountable—if we ever did.

250. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2035.
251. See id. at 2035–36 (holding that courts should first “carefully assess whether the asserted
legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President,” then “insist on a
subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative object,” then
show attentiveness “to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena
advance a valid legislative purpose,” and finally “be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the
President by a subpoena”).
252. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431.

